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Abstract 
Distributed system has been used in Digital Mine System. Because of the complexity inherent in distributed systems, security has 
become a crucial aspect in it. This paper proposed an access control mechanism for distributed system. By enforcing dynamic 
authorization as well as fine-grained organization of resource object, the access control policy provides the required flexibility of 
security management and deployment for Digital Mine System 
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1. Introduction 
Distributed systems relying on middleware are used in Digital Mine System including smart cards, PDAs, 
embedded systems, standard PCs and workstations, and high–performance application servers. One of the prime 
reasons for employing distributed systems rather than centralized systems is the potential for combining resources to 
build systems that are more powerful than any single centralized system[1]. Another reason why distributed systems 
are used is the increased availability of resources that may be achieved if single point of failure is avoided and 
redundancy is provided in the design of a system. 
An immediate consequence of all these uses of distributed systems is that multiple different nodes and resources 
have to be installed and managed. The complexity inherent in distributed systems constitutes a major problem for 
overall security. 
2. Security problems and solutions 
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2.1.  Security problems 
The main question in distributed systems is how the specification, deployment and management of application–
oriented access control policies in distributed object systems can be supported in a way that increases the overall 
security. 
2.2. Ways to solve the problems 
It is concluded that an integrated approach to secure software development and management is required and that it 
can best be supported by the definition of a declarative policy language. The technical feasibility of the access 
control is shown through an implementation of the required security infrastructure, which includes an interceptor–
based access control mechanism, a language compiler, objects and role repositories.  
Allocating security functions at the application level and not at the level of individual operating systems is first an 
important step to reduce the complexity incurred by heterogeneity. The primary focuses of Security Service are thus 
security policies for application objects. The central concepts of access control policy are views as a first–class 
concept for the type–safe aggregation of access rights, roles as a task–oriented abstraction of callers, and schemas as 
a means of specifying triggered dynamic changes in the protection state. 
3. Access control mechanism 
Any mechanism for controlling access to resource objects must be able to intercept and check all possible 
accesses, i.e., the mechanism must be interposed between the object and its callers and not be bypassed.         
Interceptors are a convenient way to implement this mechanism and the security service specifies an access 
control interceptor for this purpose. The implementation presented here also uses an interceptor. Figure 1 illustrates 
how access requests are intercepted and then checked by an Access Decision object. If the access is allowed, it is 
passed on to the target object; otherwise a denial reply message is returned to the caller. 
 
Fig. 1. Access control with interceptor 
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There is a session context for each principal-target pair. This session context contains the access policy 
information that applies to the target object, the principal information about the caller and a cache of previously 
made access decisions. The interceptor establishes this context upon the first request to a given target and the Access 
Decision object retrieves and updates it, if necessary. 
Access control is performed when processes try to access protected objects at runtime. It is shown, however, that 
policy issues must be addressed in earlier stages in the application life cycle to enable appropriate runtime 
management. The following context describes the management tasks related to access policies at runtime and the 
deployment of earlier stages. 
The three main tasks that can be identified correspond directly to what can be called the three basic dimensions of 
access control: principal management, object management and policy management, they and their relationship to 
access policy are examined as following. 
3.1. Policy management 
• Policy representation 
The improved access control policy includes several concepts: subject(principal), role, view, object. There are 
two extra elements which are role and view when subjects access operations. The policy is described as follows: 
After identity authentication, a subject is assigned to several roles, among which there are constraints called 
constraints1. Objects organized by views are used to call System resources, which benefits to fine-grained security 
modeling and management. There are constraints called constraints2 between operations of objects. The content of 
policy item is a mapping from roles to views. The mapping is realized by constraints called constraints3, the 
relationship between the elements is shown in the following Fig.2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Policy rules 
There are three kinds of Constraints:                                                    
constraints1: There are three kinds of constraints when a role is defined: base number constraints; leading role 
constraints; mutual exclusion constraints. 
constraints2: Leading operation constraints. 
constraints3: View content constraints: including views that a role possesses when the role is initialized and roles 
that a view is assigned to when the view is defined. 
• Authorization changes 
The above authorized rules except role mutual exclusion constraints are deployed when the system is initialized. 
System also needs to dynamically assign or remove specific views according to security context in running time. We 
declare the definition of dynamic rules as follows: 
dynamic submi1 observes Document  
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{ Submission  
     removes  
        view2 on this from Author } 
When the operation Submission of Document is called, view2 would be removed from the current Subject who 
has the role of Author. The assignments and removals of views specified by a dynamic rules definition are carried 
out by a dedicated interceptor which observes successful returns from operations, and then dynamic authorization is 
carried out. To do so, the interceptor needs to know about all of the dynamic rules definitions that are applied to the 
object from which processing returns. This information can be retrieved during the initial session setup and stored in 
the session context. The process of dynamic authorization is shown in Fig.3: when principle requests for a specific 
operation, the interceptor firstly detects security context, if the operation is permitted to call and executed 
successfully, the module of interceptor will change security session context by dynamic rules. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Dynamic change authentication 
3.2. Object management 
System resources are encapsulated by objects and the visits to them are accomplished by calling operations. View, 
the subset of object operations, is used to realize fine-grained resource management. In the process of security 
modeling, views can be modeled by using the objects from system modeling. Next, we illustrate the modeling 
process. Assume that there are two types of resource: Folder and Document, and they respectively have the 
following operations: 
interface Folder  
{Lookup(); 
 Appending(); 
 listing(); 
 Removing(); } 
 
interface Document  
{Reading(); 
 Updating(); 
 Submission(); }                
According to system analysis, a role called author who might use Lookup() and Append() operations of Folder as 
well as Reading(), Updating() and Submission operations of Document, therefore four of views can be established as 
follows. 
View view1 control Folder restricted to author 
{ Allow Lookup(); 
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         Append(); } 
 
View view2 control Document  
{ Allow Reading();} 
 
View view3:view2  restricted to author 
{ Allow  
         Updating();} 
View view4 control Document restricted to author 
{ Allow Submission();} 
View1, view4 and view3 inherited from view2 are all restricted to author, therefore, a permission item is defined 
when a view with role constraints is defined. In the above definition, an operation is the smallest resource grain. The 
fine-grained authorization avoids the shortage of traditional access control in which there are only three coarse-
grained operations to resources: reading, writing, execution, therefore it is easy to combine security modeling into 
system modeling. 
3.3. Principal management 
Technically, requests in a distributed system are always initiated by processes and arrive at a target over 
potentially insecure channels. Processes are commonly called subjects in the security literature, from the perspective 
of an access control mechanism at the target object side, the only immediately identifiable entity is the 
communication endpoint and thus the channel over which a request arrived. However, channels are a low–level, 
technical concept that is not suitable as a basis for access decisions. Consequently, other access control information 
needs to be obtained and authenticated, which then permits to deal with a more abstract notion of principals. A 
channel must present credentials, which are a proof that the channel speaks for a principal at this time. 
The abstraction of principals is realized by supplying and verifying credentials and these credentials must be 
created and managed. Typically, credentials in distributed systems are public key certificates and rely on public key 
infrastructure. A typical way of assigning credentials in current distributed systems is to store them in repositories 
such as provided by the X.500 or LDAP directories. These support hierarchical modelling of organizations and thus 
allow managers to navigate the user population using structures with which they are familiar, i.e., organizational 
structures like branches, departments, and groups. 
3.4. Matrix of security context 
The access control policy ultimately consists of an access control matrix and dynamic authorization rules 
[3].Subjects and roles have separate rows in the matrix because assignment need to refer to individual subjects , not 
just to roles . Types have columns in the matrix because a resource is assigned to a principal on all objects of a given 
type. We illustrate as follows: 
There are two type resources which are Folder and Document and three roles: Secretary, Author and Editor, all 
the roles are assigned operations respectively by views. When the subject---Zhang who is assigned roles of 
Secretary and Editor, login, there will be a new item to Zhang in the matrix. Because secretary role has the 
operations: Lookup() in Folder , Reading() in Document , and Editor role has the operations: Listing (),Append(), 
Removing() in Folder and Reading() in Document , the subject will have the following operations: Lookup(), 
Listing(), Append(), Removing() in Folder and Reading() in Document , as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Matrix of security context 
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 The matrix supports a structure in context cache to realize fine-grained resources management and provides a 
reference for decision-making in security context. 
The above model prevents active packets from calling unsafe operations by fine-grained object management and 
realizes flexible access control by the combination of dynamic and static authorization. 
4. Policy deployment 
The required access language must allow developers to provide a static policy specification that is independent of 
the target environment and is delivered with the application. This specification may be refined during deployment in 
the target environment and managed during the lifetime of the application. 
Before deployed, an access policy needs to check type and verify language constraints. The final product of the 
policy development stage is a policy design document that is delivered as a descriptor file with the application. The 
XML is an established standard format for descriptors.  The advantage of XML is that XML is an open standard for 
which a variety of tools is publicly available. Therefore, the compiler is designed as a combination of a pre-compiler 
and a backend verifier that accepts XML files as input, as shown in Fig.4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Policy deployment 
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5. Conclusions 
• The main question addressed in this paper is how the deployment and management of application–oriented 
access control policies in distributed object systems can be supported. 
• The security management of this access control mechanism includes: policy management, objects management, 
principle management. 
• The mechanism realize dynamic authentication according to security context. 
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